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What We Do to Law Students-Or The Judicial
Philosophy of W. Barton Leach
Kenneth E. Gray*
Law students who have "survived" their first year in law school
(the author included) frequently maintain that their first year was
the most intellectually meaningful, yet the most difficult challenge
they ever faced. Scott Turow's recent book One L amply illustrates
contemporary dismay and resentment with the terrors of the first
year in law school. Turow writes:
I began to read in the extensive psychological literature about
law school and was reassured to learn that my bad spell was
hardly unique. 'I have never seen more manifest anxieties in a
group of persons under "normal" circumstances than is visible
in first year law students,' one psychiatrist had written.'
Quoting a fictionalized Harvard faculty member, Turow has him
say:
I keep running into Harvard Law School graduates, people of
all ages, who tell me that 'court held no fear' for them. A lot of
them are men who fought in World War II or Korea or Vietnam,
and most say that- even having had those experiences, they
never felt as scared or oppressed as they did when they were
law students at Harvard; and that afterwards, by comparison,
their anxiety about going into a courtroom for the first time was
nothing. Well, I'm glad if we can prepare our students so that
they feel self-confident about performing their professional
tasks. But it doesn't fill me with pride to be part of an institu-
tion that has provided so many people with the worst times of
their lives. I don't think that's an affirmative thing to say about
this law school. I think there has to be something wrong with
a place like that.'
Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. B.A., Iona College, 1966; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1969; M.P.A., Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
1970.
1. S. Tutow, ONE L: AN INSIDE AccouNT OF LI IN THE FIRST YEAR AT HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL 168 (1977).
2. Id. at 169.
Duquesne Law Review
Law professors are often not so understanding. In an article some
years ago, Professor Loiseaux observed the following about under-
graduate pre-law education:
Our student learned the techniques for answering true and
false or multiple choice questions, and how to memorize lines,
paragraphs, or even chapters. Occasionally he would be re-
quired to write a paper. Just before the deadline he compiled
some materials which he hoped the instructor had not read
lately and submitted the same. That was the end of the matter.
Such techniques were necessary in order to enable our student
to take full benefit of the non-intellectual activities which were
supported and emphasized by the university . . . What reac-
tion when our student enters professional school? Most law
teachers agree, he still cannot read or write. However, there is,
or should be, an intellectual crisis in our student's development
.. The instructor is not going to tell him by organized
lecture what he should know; in fact, some of his instructors
are so dastardly that they only ask questions. He feels at times
during his first year that he is being cheated because he came
to learn the 'law.' This hurts; he is a specialist in memorization
and there is nothing to memorize. He may think the object is
to find and underline the best sounding principle and to collect
these principles for his mental catalogue. He is reluctant to
question the printed word and more reluctant to question the
instructor. He is shocked when he hears, in answer to a discus-
sion problem, that the instructor does not know the answer.
Then he realizes that when principles in two succeeding cases
are inconsistent either the second is an exception or one repre-
sents the majority and the other the minority rule. With this
he is well satisfied until the instructor says with emphasis that
he is not interested in which is the majority rule.
Thus the student proceeds: many trials and much sweat.
This may be inhumane and needlessly brutal but he will sur-
vive and be a better man for it.3
Many law school faculty members would whole-heartedly agree
with these observations (possibly substituting the word "person" for
"man" in the last line of the quotation). Indeed, embarking upon a
legal career has always been difficult, even before Christopher Co-
3. Loiseaux, The Newcomer and the Case Method, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 244, 248-49 (1954).
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lumbus Langdell taught his first class. Daniel Webster wrote the
following about pre-Langdellian legal education:
A boy of twenty, with no previous knowledge of such subjects,
cannot understand Coke. It is folly to set him upon such an
author. There are propositions in Coke so abstract, and distinc-
tions so nice, and doctrines embracing so many distinctions
and qualifications, that it requires an effort not only of a ma-
ture mind but of a mind both strong and mature, to understand
him. Why disgust and discourage a young man by telling him
he must break into his profession through such a wall as this?4
Nevertheless, student resentment, or perhaps one should say pas-
sive resistance, whether justified or not in the eyes of the faculty is
a disturbing fact of life. As Professor Francis A. Allen has observed,
"it is by no means true that these tendencies were unheard of in
previous student generations. What is distinctive about the present
situation is the intensity of their widespread expression in recent
years." 5 Professor Allen concludes:
At no time will a teacher worthy of the name be indifferent to
the expectations of his students; and in an age of consumerism
student demands and dissatisfactions are likely to be given
even greater attention. Law teachers have reacted in different
ways to the anti-intellectualism that pervades many students'
attitudes. Some have found the student demands to be consis-
tent with their own vision of law school training. Others have
succumbed after token resistance, while still others continue to
resist. Some of those latter, while adhering to the values of
intellectually rigorous and humanistically oriented law teach-
ing, have encountered exceptional difficulties in achieving
effective communication with their students, difficulties that
leave both them and their students bemused and dissatisfied.
However these dynamics are to be weighed, certain conse-
quences are clear. One of these is that lesser intellectual de-
mands are being made on students in some law school class-
rooms today than a decade ago . . . .Few will mourn the
passing of the savagery that sometimes defaced the teaching of
4. Quoted by Schofield, Christopher Columbus Langdell, 55 AM. L. REG. 274 (1907). The
article is a beautiful tribute paid by a former student to a beloved teacher.
5. Allen, The New Anti-Intellectualism in American Legal Education, 21 LAw QUAD.
NoTEs 6, 11 (1977).
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the past. Nevertheless, little can be said for a pedagogical exer-
cise that permits a student to leave the classroom believing
that a slovenly effort at analysis or generalization satisfies ac-
ceptable professional and intellectual standards. Involved in
the question of intellectual rigor is the problem of value analy-
sis. Such analysis is the essence of humanistic education in any
discipline, but a discussion of values in the classroom unac-
companied by demands for clear and responsible thought may
quickly degenerate into a kind of propaganda or sentimental-
ism.,
A substantial cause of present intellectual and emotional disfunc-
tion among law students may lie in our failure to understand fully
or clearly enunciate the inner dynamics of the case method itself
based, as it has traditionally been, on the inductive form of reason-
ing. Value judgments in our classroom versions of the legal world are
usually reached in unfamiliar ways that differ from the preconcep-
tions of our students. This threat to their comfortable notions, by
what seems to be an incomprehensible reasoning process, causes
intolerable intellectual dissonance that is too frequently resolved in
the form of apathy, resistance, sophism, cynicism and professional
mediocrity or worse.7 The law teaching profession might do better
if we attempted more often to explain how and why we reason so
differently in law school and just what the implications of "thinking
like a lawyer" are for our students.
THE CASE METHOD
It has been said that "[tihe most influential law teacher who
ever lived in the United States-or for that matter in any English
speaking community-was Christopher Columbus Langdell."'
Scott Turow, dramatizing his first tour of the Harvard Law School
campus has his upperclassman friend, David, stop at the law school
library building, Langdell Hall, and say:
6. Id. at 10.
7. See Gorla, A Civil Lawyer Looks at American Law School Instruction, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC.
515, 517 (1951) (author comments perceptively on the tendency of American law schools to
cater to the intellectually brightest students).
8. Gross, On Law School Training in Analytic Skill, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261, 267 (1973)
makes a similar plea.
9. Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1141 (1938).
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The building is named for the late Christopher Columbus
Langdell, who was dean of Harvard Law School in the late
nineteenth century. Dean Langdell is best known as the inven-
tor of the Socratic method.
David lowered his hand and looked sincerely at the building.
'May he rot in hell,' David said. 0
Now everyone knows that Dean Langdell was chiefly responsible
for the case method of study in law school.
Having a course on Contracts to teach, Langdell placed in the
hands of each student the decisions on the subject under dis-
cussion, chiefly English, which he wished them to read; and the
change in method was made. His predecessor had placed in the
hands of each of his students his own Treatise on Contracts, for
which Langdell had made the notes."
Beale states that Langdell never claimed to have discovered a
method of teaching, but a method of study, "teaching to him was
relatively unimportant."'" It is to Langdell's famous pupil, James
Barr Ames, that credit for introducing the Socratic teaching method
must go.' 3
Langdell's program of having law students study reports of deci-
sions in individual cases provoked great controversy in its day, but
since his system has now been adopted in most American law
schools, there has been little written about the subject over the last
60 years or so. A 1951 article by Professor Edwin W. Patterson of
Columbia presents a comprehensive review of the subject.'4 Patter-
son finds four critical presuppositions of the case method (as viewed
by its early protagonists). It is scientific, pedagogical, pragmatic
and historical. 5 The contention that it is scientific is perhaps the
most intriguing. Langdell argued that the law library was to the law
student what "the laboratories of the university are to the chemists
and physicists, the museum of natural history to the zoologists, the
10. Tuaow, supra note 1, at 40.
11. Beale, Langdell, Gray, Thayer and Ames-Their Contribution to the Study and
Teaching of Law, 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 385, 386 (1931).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 393.
14. Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal Education: Its Origin and Objectives,
4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1951).
15. Id. at 2.
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botanical garden to the botanists."'" Professor Arthur E. Sutherland
commented:
A weakness in the philosophy of Langdell's method lay in its
assumption that the social science of the law was fundamen-
tally like a natural science; that its essential process was obser-
vation of phenomena and derivation from that observation of
constant "laws" of chemistry or physics. Langdell was a per-
ceptive man, not naive; he knew, of course, that men could
change their enacted or decisional laws to suit their conveni-
ence, whereas they could not amend the law of gravity. Perhaps
the scientism pervasive among intellectuals during his youth
and early middle years had constrained him to express the
analogy of law to natural science as though it were an essential
likeness, even when he knew it was not really so. But whatever
error of perception he may have entertained, still his insistence
on scrupulously exact examination of legal materials, on their
classification according to essential likenesses and differences,
were disciplines of great value.' 7
Patterson draws roughly the same conclusion, stating that, "the
argument that the case method is 'scientific' must, then, be taken
as chiefly rhetorical.""' In none of the early discussions analogizing
the case method to "science," either the experimental sciences
(physics and chemistry) or the sciences largely dependent on classi-
fication, maintains Patterson, "was it recognized that a rule or prin-
ciple of law is primarily normative or prescriptive in meaning,
whereas scientific propositions are either true or false upon the basis
of empirical observations."' 9 On the whole, concludes Patterson,
"the 'scientific' arguments for the case method were at bottom pe-
dagogical."' " The purpose of the case method was to develop the
student's powers of legal reasoning.
It would be easy to view the case method as principally a pedagog-
ical or self-study tool designed to promote student self-reliance,
rigor, precision, comprehensiveness, and thoroughness of under-
standing; a sort of Montessori approach of law that is also of great
16. Id. at 3 (quoting Christopher Columbus Langdell, 3 L. Q. REv. 123, 124 (1887)).
17. A. SUrHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967, 178
(1967).
18. Patterson, supra note 14, at 4.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id. at 5.
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pragmatic value because it simulates the thing a common law law-
yer has to do all his life, namely to "extract or develop law from
facts."' Students, of course, quickly learn that outlines and canned
briefs can easily short circuit (for examination purposes at least) the
admittedly time consuming, painstaking case-book method.2" But
to look at it solely in this way would, I think, be a mistake. While
it would serve no purpose to quibble over a definition of the term
"scientific," the case method as used in contemporary law school
classes is "scientific" in at least two critical respects. First, the case
method, whether "empirical" or not, is certainly "inductive," that
is, it generally relies on reasoning from the particular to the gen-
eral.13 Rules, laws and principles are reached only after an examina-
tion of individual fact situations (both actual cases and
"hypotheticals"). Second, the case method arrives at conclusions or
opinions that themselves are hypotheses, are subject to change in
the light of new data. We have long abandoned Langdell's apparent
belief in fixed, immutable principles which were thought to underlie
all man-made law. Our rules or principles (arrived at by the case
method) are tentative-they are "hypotheses" subject to further
"testing." We are not as firmly bound by precedents (at least in the
classroom.) We are more willing today in an age of rapid social and
technological change to recognize feedback; and to recognize that
new situations tomorrow may require us to revise rules drawn up to
meet today's needs. This open-endedness, this relativity of law is
usually grasped more readily, I believe, by students who have had
some scientific background in undergraduate school, although I can
offer no systematic empirical study to prove the point. But it is here
that another variable enters the picture-the ability of men to
choose, to make value judgments. We discuss rules in terms of
whether they, or the results they produce "make sense," are just,
fair, equitable, or comport with public policy, "whatever that
means! " There is a value component in our dialogues about law, a
judgmental factor that is not present when studying the laws of
21. See Patterson, supra note 14, at 6 (quoting letter from Prof. J.C. Gray to Editors of
YALE L.J.).
22. See Campbell, Comparison of Educational Methods and Institutions, 4 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 25 (1951); Loftman, Study Habits and Their Effectiveness in Legal Education, 27 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 418, 418 (1975). Loftman quotes Harry Pratter: "Tihird, and perhaps most
important, this course is practical because the casebook, materials and even the lectures
themselves may help you understand your Gilbert's outline." Id.
23. Patterson, supra note 14, at 5 n.15, seems to concede this.
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physics; and this factor enters into our studies in a unique way
because of the case method. We generally do not make or propose
value judgments in our classrooms based upon detailed codes of
principles, but on how we evaluate the possible outcomes of a given
case or set of cases. It is a form of inductive ethics or "situation
ethics" that our students usually are not used to and moreover,
never have explained to them very well. Each student in our class
(within the narrow confines of a particular case) becomes his own
judge and his own legislator, as well as his own pope. The implica-
tions of all of this, as discussed below, would seem to bear further
investigation. Professor Sutherland has pointed out that:
In the years that followed the Civil War a system of thought
then described as 'positivism,' the concept that knowledge is
based exclusively on the methods and discoveries of the physi-
cal or 'positivist' sciences, was deeply moving young Harvard
intellectuals- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., William James,
John Fiske, Henry Adams, and Brooks' Adams who 'came to
history seeking science.' Langdell has left no such record of his
reading as Holmes left, but he cannot have escaped the deep
intellectual currents of the time. His gospel was the application
of the method of the natural sciences to the science of society.
To him proper study of the law, like the study of chemistry,
physics, zoology, and botany, consisted in the careful observa-
tion and recording of many specific instances, and then from
these instances derivation of general conclusions that the quali-
ties of the phenomena or specimens observed would hold con-
stant for other instances of the same classes. 4
Langdell was apparently not, however, the dogmatic his critics sup-
posed: the last "theologian" of the law, to use Holmes' approba-
tion.2-
Professor Langdell was always willing to reconsider a conclu-
sion in the light of new suggestions. Not infrequently in new
courses with which he had not become thoroughly familiar, he
would recant propositions which he had advanced as sound. A
student recently informed me of a course in which Professor
Langdell changed his opinion in regard to a case three times
in the course of one week, each time advancing with positive-
24. SUTHERLAND, supra note 17, at 176.
25. See Noonan, Belief in Law and Belief in Religion, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 386 (1975).
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ness a new doctrine. That he could do this without losing the
respect or confidence of his students shows the esteem in which
he was held. They well knew that he was a teacher of originality
and great industry, with no object but to discover and state
truly the principles of the law. To lose confidence in him for
changing his position upon a legal proposition would be as
absurd as to lose confidence in Charles Darwin if he withdrew
a tentative conclusion found to be false after more extended
investigation. Professor Langdell studied the law as contained
in the reports in the same spirit in which the great scientists
study the phenomena of nature. 6
It is surprising that the influence of nineteenth century scientism
and the influence of Pierce, James and Dewey in particular, includ-
ing the jurisprudential implications of their thought, are not exam-
ined and studied more.2
THE SOCRATIC METHOD: TERROR AND PRECISION
To quote the Harvard Law School Handbook for Entering Law
Students:
You have doubtless -learned at some time of the 'Socratic
method,' which is much used at Harvard Law School and is
almost a corollary of the case method. This is the system of
teaching in which, instead of telling you directly, the teacher
by his carefully thought out questions leads you and.your class-
mates into discovering and expressing for yourselves the points
the teacher wishes to make. You may wonder at first how this
can be done with so large a group. Soon you will see that it is
eminently practical, for the more people there are, the more
ideas there will be, and the professor will want to hear from as
many of you as wish to contribute.2
It is most unusual to find such an unconsciously candid admission
that the Socratic method can be a tool of indoctrination par
26. Schofield, supra note 4, at 276-77.
27. For related examples of the use of the case-method and other "inductive" approaches,
see Vagts, The "Other" Case Method Education for Counting House and Court House
Compared, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 403 (1977); Oleck, Adversary Method of Law Teaching
Summarized, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 86 (1975); Misner, Teaching Contracts with Contracis, 28 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 550 (1977).
28. Harvard Law School, Handbook for Entering Law Students 15 (1966).
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excellance. Usually the descriptions of the Socratic method take a
more earnest view:
Student participation in the class discussion is still, I believe,
an essential feature of the case method, and one which ought
to be preserved at the sacrifice of some other values, such as
additional information or a more orderly and explicit presenta-
tion of the teacher's ideas about the subject matter. The
'Socratic dialogue' was the early ideal of class discussion. A
student was asked to summarize orally a case in the book, the
teacher asked him questions about it or put to him a hypotheti-
cal case; the student was called upon to defend his decision in
relation to the case in the book or other cases. The hypothetical
case, skillfully chosen by the teacher, thus became one of the
chief instruments for pulling out the significance of the main
case and for extending or limiting its doctrine or principle. The
teacher, like Socrates, should ask more questions than either
he or the student can answer. This process can be intellectually
stimulating to the entire class and can give the students clues
to what they should investigate further. The creation of doubt
followed by its resolution is one of the important steps in the
process of learning. Yet the Socratic method calls for great skill
on the part of the teacher and considerable quick-wittedness on
the part of the student. When protracted to the point where
interest lags, it becomes tiresome and wasteful of time ....
One corollary of the basic principles of the case method was
that the teacher ought never to lecture, or to summarize the
conclusions to be derived from the cases and the class discus-
sion. The student was supposed to work out the conclusions
from the questions of the teacher. I doubt if it is strictly applied
by most law teachers today. 9
Turow speaks eloquently about the indoctrination effect on first
year students. He has his fictional first year colleague, Gina, say,
'They're turning me into someone else,' she said, referring to
our professors. 'They're making me different.'
I told her that was called education and she told me, quite
rightly, that I was being flip.
29. Patterson, supra note 14, at 17-18. See also Bryson, The Problem Method Adapted to
Case Books, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594 (1974).
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'It's someone I don't want to be,' she said. 'Don't you get the
feeling all the time that you're being indoctrinated?'
I was not sure that I did, but as Gina and I sat at lunch, I
began to realize that for, her and many of the other people in
the section, there was a crisis going on, one which had not yet
affected me as acutely.
On one hand the problem was as simple as the way Nicky
had put it. Students felt they were being forced to identify with
rules and social notions that they didn't really agree with
But there was a subtler difficulty in our education, one which
went to the basis of legal thinking itself and which became
especially apparent in class. We were learning more than a
process of analysis or a set of rules. In our discussions with the
professors, as they questioned us and picked at what we said,
we were also being tacitly instructed in the strategies of legal
argument, in putting what had been analyzed back together in
a way that would make our contentions persuasive to a court.
We all quickly saw that that kind of argument was supposed
to be reasoned, consistent, progressive in its logic. Nothing was
taken for granted; nothing was proven just because it was
strongly felt. All of our teachers tried to impress upon us that
you do not sway a judge with emotional declarations of faith
About the same time, from three or four others, people I
respected, I heard similar comments, all to the effect that they
were being limited, harmed, by the education, forced to substi-
tute dry reason for emotion, to cultivate opinions which were
'rational' but which had no roots in the experience, the life
they'd had before. They were being cut away from themselves .31
Accompanying the indoctrination problem is the problem of
"terror," especially in first year. The traditional attitude is well
expressed by W. Barton Leach's eulogy to Edward H. "Bull" War-
ren:
Bull Warren scared the hell out of his first year students. The
first and last commandment of Property I was 'Thou shalt
think straight.' The transgressor was justly treated. Twice,
even thrice, he was given the chance to retrieve himself, but
30. TuRow, supra note 1, at 90-92.
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when he failed the thunderbolt struck-except when in those
rare moments of Olympian self-restraint when The Bull, with
apoplexy visibly threatening, would turn away as from some-
thing found under a flat stone and seek out a student in another
part of the room.
It was The Bull's justice that hurt. The student who took a
verbal caning knew he deserved it, that he should have avoided
it, and that any other student would have received the same
treatment. As one of them said, 'Sure he treated me like a fool
but not until he had convinced me that I was.'
I believe that the effect on most men was good. In my case I
am sure of it ...
Few college students have had training in precision of
thought expressed in words. This is the stuff of the law, and it
is well that students should early acquire a respect for it. The
Bull's method inspired respect. Some sfudents wilted. There
was a Magna Cum Laude in English from a leading college who
flunked out in my class, and I am convinced the Bull did it. I
am also convinced that that student was no more fitted to be
a lawyer than my cat. If, at the age of 21 or 22, a young man
can be thrown off balance by harsh words known to be con-
structively intended, he ought seriously to consider whether he
has the temperament to engage in a profession whose members
offer themselves to the public as general trouble shooters and
whose court-room traditions still savor trial by combat.:"
Terror breeds precision and the ability and confidence necessary in
the world of the courtroom. But, others would dissent from this
view. Turow puts it this way:
[Tihe peculiar privilege which Socraticism grants a teacher
to invade the security of every student in the room means that
in the wrong hands it can become an instrument of terror. I
never felt that my education gained by my being frightened,
and I was often scared in class. Law faculties have too long
excused, in the name of academic freedom, a failure to hold
colleagues within basic limits of decency. They must formulate
and enforce an etiquette of classroom behavior which insures
that teachers cannot freely browbeat and exploit their stu-
dents. To refuse leaves them in a subtle but persistent state of
31. Leach, "Look Well to the Right .... "58 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (1945).
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moral abdication. I know that it is hard to think of law stu-
dents, headed for a life of privilege, as being among the down-
trodden; and I also recognize that classroom terror has been a
fixed aspect of legal education for at least a century. But the
risk, the ultimate risk, of allowing students to make their first
acquaintance with the law in such an atmosphere, in that state
of hopeless fright, is that they will come away with a tacit but
ineradicable impression that it is somehow characteristically
'legal' to be heartless, to be brutal, and will carry that attitude
with them into the execution of their professional tasks. 2
The issue of terror and intimidation aside, the problem of indoc-
trination must be examined further, because it is what seems genu-
inely to alienate and confuse students exposed to the Socratic
method. With what are law students being indoctrinated? Peter W.
Gross maintains that the Socratic case method "treats analytic skill
instruction largely as an inchoate chemistry. '33 One purpose of the
Socratic method, according to Gross, is to impart information. A
second use is "to teach students to think"-that is, to teach analyti-
cal skills. Gross maintains that the Socratic method is ineffective
for three reasons:
First Gross quotes Professor P. N. Savoy to the effect that: "One
problem with the 'Socratic method' as it is usually practiced is the
failure at some point to make explicit for students the nature of the
strategies we use to defeat them or the processes by which they
defeat themselves. 34
Second, it "turns students off."
Third, it reduces the amount and quality of information im-
parted.35
If one accepts the view that law should be taught in the "grand
manner," the heart of Gross' criticism is that we do not make ex-
plicit to the students the inductive nature of the analyses we expect
from them, but rather permit them to pick this up, and some never
do, by osmosis. This is an attractive critique of the Socratic method
and the difficulties it causes students, but it does not go far enough.
It fails to examine the unique system of making value judgments we
"impose" on, or expect of, our students.
32. Tuuow, supra note 1, at 296.
33. Gross, supra note 8, at 268.
34. Id. at 307.
35. Id. at 307-08.
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Much criticism may, of course, be attributed to the inherent lazi-
ness of students of whatever age. The Socratic case method is essen-
tially a method requiring self-study (and this is so regardless of its
inductive characteristics). It was said of Langdell that "[flrom
Socrates to Agassiz the characteristic mark of a great teacher is that
he makes his pupils use their own powers and do original work.
Tried by this test, Professor Langdell is fairly entitled to be called
a great teacher."3 In teaching students, Schofield contended that,
"the formation of a habit is the essential thing. When once formed
by a student he will apply it in all his work."37 Perhaps the modern
student is too accustomed to learning by lecture and by television
to be very attracted by self-study, especially when the tendency to
spoon-feed has increased in recent years (as diminishing national
test scores seem to prove). Nevertheless, this sort of observation
should not be used to cover up short-comings in our teaching or
obscurities that should be examined more carefully.
A few observations seem to be in order on the subject of teaching
law in the "grand manner" versus the vocational approach. An Ital-
ian law professor made the following observations about the place
of the Socratic case method in the center of this recurring contro-
versy:
[T]here is a grave danger that the average student may easily
lose sight of principles, insofar as the doctrine is presented to
him as a disordinate aggregate of decisions, where each one has
its own reason for being, completely independent of the others,
without connective tissue and without system. This pitfall,
though perhaps not too serious for the outstanding student,
poses a serious problem for the student of average ability who
has not had the experience nor the solid preparation necessary
for the difficulties encountered in learning principles by the
inductive method.
This weakness of the method finds an ally in the tendency
of the American law schools toward practicality. Notwith-
standing the efforts of the great law schools to put the brakes
on it, there seems an evident tendency among many schools,
which cater to student desire, to make the school a preparation
for the immediate practice of the profession, almost a substi-
tute for apprenticeship.
36. Schofield, supra note 4, at 284.
37. Id. at 282.
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The very weight of the courses concentrated in three years
results in the fact that for the average student the principles
and theory of law are sacrificed to the purely practical side of
his learning.
This trade or vocational school tendency is minimized in
civil law countries because there the student knows there will
be a sizeable period of apprenticeship after school and expects
to learn the 'trade' in the law office.3 8
Whatever the merits of Professor Gorla's view, the quarrel be-
tween the practitioners and the academicians is an old one. Profes-
sor Allen has recently written about what he regards as the new anti-
intellectualism in legal education, 39 but this dichotomy has existed
at least since Langdell's time,40 if not from the beginning of time.
This particular controversy must not, however, serve as a justifica-
tion for regarding any criticism of the Socratic case method as an
attempt to bow to student pressure or to make law school life more
of an apprenticeship experience, but rather as an attempt to make
rigorous academic study a more realistic goal for the majority of our
students by removing those impediments that retard the achieve-
ment of that goal.4
INTERMEDIATE. VALUES
It is not just inductive reasoning that stymies our students. It is
difficult to grasp how we make value judgments, especially so
since we often do not understand ourselves, as teachers, what is
really happening. The civil lawyer, Professor Gorla observed:
The concept of law as experience rather than logic, the rapid
development of American history, the complexity and variety
of the judicial precedents in forty-eight states, and the absence
of general codification-all of these influence the Americans to
study the law from a sociological point of view. It is the sociol-
38. Gorla, supra note 7, at 516-17.
39. Allen, supra note 5, at 7.
40. Patterson, supra note 14, at 11-12.
41. For more on the practical versus the academic approach, see Costello, Another Visit
to the Man Divided: A Justification for the Law Teacher's Schizophrenia, 27 J. LEGAL EDuC.
390 (1975); Funk, Interstitial Jurisprudence Illustrated in Teaching Criminal Law, 27 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 53 (1975); and Sinha and Elder, An Enlightened Legal Pedagogy for Today, 27
J. LEGAL EDUC. 572 (1975).
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ogical tendency in the study of law which leads them to exam-
ine it from a point of view we call 'de jure condendo.' (The law
as it ought to be.) Unlike our law schools, in the American law
schools legal doctrines and cases are examined even under the
aspect of their adequacy and capacity to satisfy the socio-
economic exigencies of the present day world.4"
Professor Morgan, in his classic work on the case method, describes
our best law teachers in class as only beginning with a student's
statement of the case.
When the discussion of the problem presented by the assigned
case has been exhausted, he suggests other states of facts either
imaginary or found in the reports, and requires the student to
form a judgment as to whether the variance in the facts is of
legal significance, and whether the reasoning in the assigned
case would require or justify the same or a different result. If
the reasoning would require or justify the same result, he asks
whether the result appeals to the student's sense of fairness in
the adjustment of social relations, seems of doubtful validity,
or goes so far as to shock the conscience. He seeks to have the
student consider whether the generalization stated as the basis
of decision in the principal case should be treated as univer-
sally applicable or should be modified, and to exercise his own
judgment concerning the extent to which the case should be
used as a precedent. In this process he generally informs the
student of the result reached by the courts in the other situa-
tions which he has drawn from the reports and indicates
whether the doctrines evolved by the cases have been modified
by statute.43
Is the result a good one? or a right one? Professor Fuller has observed
that "when we discuss the 'rightness' of a case, the question 'What
do we mean by "right"?' is bothersome, but we are afraid to meet
it head on."" Professor Cavers points out that when students give
their classroom (or bluebook) improvisations, "they talk loosely
about the court's reaching the right result (without showing what
42. Gorla, supra note 7, at 516.
43. Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379, 384 (1952).
44. Funk, supra note 41, at 57 (quoting Professor Lon Fuller). See also Bresnahan,
"Ethics" and the Study and Practice of Law: The Problem of Being Professional in a Fuller
Sense, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 209 (1976).
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result is right or why) or about the judge's doing what he wants to
do (without showing why he wants to do what he does). They patter
a little about balancing social and economic interests (without de-
fining the interests at stake or showing how they can be
weighted). 45
We deal with value judgments; we evaluate; we judge alternate
decisions and courses of conduct, but hesitatingly! Most traditional
law professors avoid broad public questions altogether. As a stu-
dent, I can vividly recall how frustrating it was to reach a critical
point in a discussion only to have a professor move to something else
with the transitional dismissal of, "Oh, that's a policy question!"
But values are inculcated (or indoctrinated?). "It is almost amus-
ing," states Professor Llewellyn, "to see the eagerness with which
the same law teachers who shun all mention of high ideals roll up
their sleeves to inculcate those low ideals (which still are true ideals)
known as the better doctrine or the wiser rule or the true principle
in some particular aspect of some particular 'field.' And often with
success."" Through astute use of the Socratic dialogue, we can con-
vince students of the soundness of these "low ideals." The problem
is that the students often do not understand what is happening to
them (and neither do we) because we are making these value judg-
ments in a limited way, and making them inductively, that is,
through a comparison of individual cases, results, fact situations,
consequences, but not solely or even substantially on the basis of a
priori principles. This may be what those less than brilliant stu-
dents have some right to complain about because they are faced
with an inexact, unarticulated way of reaching value judgments
that is directly contrary to rigid ethical patterns instilled early in
life and never systematically reconsidered. Lon Fuller has pointed
out that this matter is not entirely unrelated to the larger question
of whether law school should be a trade school or a humanistic
enterprise.
The problem addresses itself finally to the law student . . .
Shall he search out the professor who can expound 'the existing
law' . . .? Or shall his preference lie for the man who can
impart an insight into the shifting ethical background against
which 'the law as it is' appears as an accidental configuration
45. Funk, supra note 41, at 57-58 (quoting Cavers).
46. K. Llewellyn, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 178 (1962).
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without lasting importance? A similar problem of choice con-
fronts him in directing his own studies. The way in which the
law student decides these questions transcends in importance
its effects on his own career, for, through the subtle pressures
he exerts on his instructors to teach him what he thinks he
ought to be taught, he exercises an influence on legal educa-
tion-and indirectly on the law-much greater than he has any
conception of."
If we are going to persuade students of the better path to pursue,
we ought to devote additional energy to exploring our ways of mak-
ing value judgments.
LEGALISM
The main thrust of the book Situation Ethics, says author Joseph
Fletcher, "was against legalism. This was because almost all people
in our Western culture. . . are and have been legalistic. They hang
on to certain eternally invariable rules of conduct as absolutely valid
and universally obliging regardless of the situation."" Strangely
perhaps, the one group Fletcher would have to exclude from this
broad grouping is the bulk of the American legal profession! Profes-
sor Morgan describes the objectives of legal education as including
a capacity (on the part of the student) to "think hard and straight,
[with] a settled determination to accept the ipse dixit of no man
or group of men . . .," Another commentator has suggested that in
law school, "the inculcated reliance on authority must give way to
reliance on more subtle uses of the understanding. '50
Lawyers are pragmatists. American lawyers are doubly prag-
matic. They eschew 'theory for its own sake' both in their pro-
fessional training and in practice-it does not produce results,
and it is suspect as an excuse for avoiding the hard problems
of producing results. For, it is intrinsic to the common law
tradition that a constant evolution of legal rules is being sought
by lawyers as a problem-solving exercise to achieve a well-
working society. The common law tradition operates as a gen-
47. Allen, supra note 5, at 11.
48. Fletcher, Reflection and Reply, in Th SrrUATION ETmics DEBATE 250 (H. Cox, ed.
1968).
49. Morgan, supra note 43, at 391.
50. Funk, supra note 41, at 53.
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eration to generation striving after ever increasing usefulness of
legal institutions, and so its central characteristic is the 'case
by case' approach and a vigilance against becoming entrapped
in the excessively constructive abstractions of 'black letter
law.' One has only to think of constitutional interpretation,
on one level, or the way in which commercial practice and
commercial law reciprocally influence one another on a differ-
ent level, to see how little likely it is that common law attor-
neys will be impressed by elegantia juris and speculative sub-
tleties. The common law attorney prizes thought because it
works well-the 'cash value' of truth forms an abiding inspira-
tion of his professional life.5
Have we failed in our professed aim? Not in most cases. Fletcher is
expressing the layman's understanding of law and legalistic reason-
ing, which is of necessity going to be the law student's understand-
ing until such time as we help change it into a more mature view.
Most beginning students cling to black letter law. The very idea
that individuals in our common law system (judges, litigants, advo-
cates) make law, in all but the simplest cases, in addition to legisla-
tors, is difficult to grasp or accept.2 So is the idea that the law must
consider the unique facts of an individual case. When problems
arise, laymen tend to take the deductive approach of the civil law.13
Life is more certain that way. Yet the American judicial process "is
most at home when it disposes of a unique conflict situation unique
uniquely." 5' And,
To any student it is an important intellectual stage when he
first realizes that all law is in a state of constant motion, like a
kaleidoscope,. I do not remember just when this realization
came to me; I know it was not while in the Law School; but as
I look back, I note a great difference in all my notions about
law since the time of that realization. 55
Attempts to live with this uncertainty can be distressful, and for
many people impossible. It is hardly surprising then, that students
51. Bresnahan, supra note 44, at 204.
52. Even John Rawls seems to miss this point. See Murphy, Book Review, 25 J. LEGAL
EDC. 494 (1973).
53. See Kronstein, Reflections on the Case Method-In Teaching Civil Law, 3 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 265 (1950). See also, Gorla, supra note 7, at 517-18.
54. Gross, supra note 8, at 299 (quoting Cowan).
55. Id. (quoting Wigmore).
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will look for certainty and resent not finding it. Many assume that
they have come to law school principally to learn what books they
must read in order to get a definitive answer to any legal question
presented, in keeping with the notion that all the answers are in the
library, and that is is just a matter of finding the right book! Indeed,
one must concede that there is something of this urge in the scien-
tism of Langdell and the early case-method advocates." But it is a
painful process for many students to relinquish the quest for abso-
lute rules and absolute answers.
The following may serve as a typical illustration of what has been
described above as the layman's view of law. An elderly friend of the
author's serves as an administrator at a large municipal hospital.
From 11:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. the hospital cafeteria is reserved for
doctors and nurses working at the hospital. After 1:00 p.m., the
cafeteria is open to the general public and this fact is prominently
posted about the premises. One afternoon, around ten minutes to
one, an elderly gentlemen and two members of his family sought
entrance to the cafeteria which by now was almost entirely empty.
They just wanted to sit there until one o'clock when he planned to
purchase some lunch. The cafeteria was the only pleasant place to
wait at the hospital and the admission of the group would not have
caused any security problems or difficulties with the clean-up crew.
Nevertheless our intrepid administrator would have none of it. She
got into a heated argument with this gentleman and insisted that
he wait ouside until one o'clock. What was most amazing to me
about this little story was the vehemence with which our adminis-
trator repeated the incident. There was no rationalization about
"what if everyone tried to enter the cafeteria early" (rule utilitarian-
ism). No, our administrator was still visibly upset over the fact that
the gentleman seeking entrance could not seem to understand that
"rules were rules," and that they must be followed to the letter
regardless of whether the rule made any possible sense in this situa-
tion. If our administrator had been a lawyer trained at one of our
finer law schools, the chances are that she would have let the old
gentleman in, at least on the theory of cessante ratione, cessat ipsa
lex (a kind of act utilitarianism).
What we as law teachers are really superintending may perhaps
best be described as a maturing process amongst our students. In
56. See Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis
Falls, 80 HARV. L. REv. 799 (1967).
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truly pioneering work done at Harvard's Center for Moral Develop-
ment, Professor Lawrence Kohlberg has proposed, on the basis of
extensive empirical research, that there are six distinct states of
moral development which may be briefly described as follows:
I. Preconventional Level
At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels
of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in
terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of
action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms
of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and
labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:
Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation.
Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation.
II. Conventional Level
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's
family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own
right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The
attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations
and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining,
supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the
persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the
following stages:
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or 'good boy-nice
girl' orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps
others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to
stereotypical images of what is majority or 'natural' behavior.
Stage 4: The 'law and order' orientation. There is orientation
toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social
order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing
respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for
its own sake.
I. Postconventional, autonomous, or principal level.
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and
principles which have validity and application apart from the
authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and
apart from the individual's own identification with these
groups. This level again has two stages:
Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation, generally
with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in
terms of general individuals rights, and standards which have
been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society.
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There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values
and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural
rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitution-
ally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of
personal 'values' and 'opinion.' The result is an emphasis upon
the 'legal point of view,' but with an emphasis upon the possi-
bility. of changing law in terms of rational considerations of
social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 'law and
order'). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract
is the binding element of obligation. This is the 'official' moral-
ity of the American government and constitution.
Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation. Right is
defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen
ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, uni-
versality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and
ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are
not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At
heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the
reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the
dignity of human beings as individual persons.57
Kohlberg would presumably place the better type of reasoning pur-
sued in law schools (which we have discussed) in stage 5 midway
between stages 4 and 6, both of which stages, at least on the surface,
involve deducing correct behavior from general principles. In estab-
lishing his various stages, Kohlberg relies on a number of factual
examples of moral dilemmas (we might go so far as to call them
"cases.") Perhaps the most famous is the case of the man who has
a dying wife and who must decide whether to "steal" from an "evil"
storekeeper who refuses to sell him medicine needed by the spouse. 5
These cases or dilemmas were put to children of various ages, and
their responses over a period of years help form the basis of Kohl-
berg's conclusions. Kohlberg's theories and extensive writings have
57. Kohlberg, From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away
with It in the Study of Moral Development, in COGNITIE DEVELOPMENT AND EPIsTEMOLOGY
164-65 (T. Mischel, ed. 1971).
58. Id. at 165. See also Mackey, Discussing Moral Dilemmas in the Classroom, ENG. J.
28-30 (1975); Leach, A Professorship of Legal Education Recommended, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 149
(1949). Mackey's article is startling for he presents hypothetical cases of moral dilemmas
strikingly similar to cases we use in law classes. Leach's article is the only article I have found
that calls for a consideration of educational psychology and its possible effects on law teach-
ing.
Vol. 17: 381
Law Students
been widely discussed in the fields of psychology, religion, education
and philosophy. It is truly surprising that they have been so little
noticed in legal education. 5 If we are engaged in helping along a
process of moral maturation in our students, should we not devote
more attention than we have to that process? And take greater pains
to explain and understand the values and the system of making
value judgments we inculcate? Should not the growth of our stu-
dents in understanding be as important to us as growth in the law
itself?
SOME LESSONS
Rather than to continue generally discussing value judgments in
legal teaching, it would seem to be much more useful at this point
to illustrate the way value judgments are inculcated with specific
examples. All the following examples are taken from either the Cas-
ner and Leach casebook for Property,0 or the Leach and Logan
casebook on Future Interests and Estate Planning." The author has
taught both courses many times using these materials. Conscious of
what has been called the "debilitating notion that a sound way to
teach a course is from detailed blueprints prepared by an author-
ity,"" there are, nevertheless, immense advantages in studying the
mind of a great teacher as expressed in his ingenious and creative
casebooks and teachers' manuals. In the author's case, while not
having had the sense or advantage to take a course with W. Barton
Leach when the opportunity presented itself, the manuals have
been most helpful in illustrating the philosophy, the grand design
behind many of the law school courses the author was exposed to
in student days. In spite of his numerous law review articles (many
of truly landmark quality, especially with respect to reform of the
Rule against Perpetuities) Leach's genius is, I think, best illustrated
in his case books and the manuals prepared for them. In his areas
59. For further readings in the area, see Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cogni-
tive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAUZATION THEORY AND
RESEARcH 347 (D. Goslin, ed. 1969); Gibbs, Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Judgment: A Con-
structive Critique, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 43 (1977); Giarelli, Lawrence Kohlberg and G.E.
Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy, 26 EDUC. THEORY 348 (1976); Sichel, Can Kohlberg Re-
spond to Critics? 26 EDUC. THEORY 337 (1976). The Gibbs article contains an excellent bibliog-
raphy.
60. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY (2d ed. 1969).
61. W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNJNG: CASES AND TEXT
(1961).
62. Mueller, There Is Madness in Our Methods, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 93 (1950).
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of specialization Leach was a brilliant critic and reformer. 3 This is
not surprising once one has a glimpse of his methodology, his rigor-
ousness, his open-ended inductive approach and, I believe, his pene-
trating value judgments. For me, his writings illustrate not only a
sophisticated approach to making legal value judgments, but also,
in turn, a way of thought that virtually necessitates a reforming
spirit.64
1. The Case of the Bees.
Problem 2.4 in Casner and Leach provides:
0 owns land in a city which has a zoning law. O's land is
located in what is termed an R-1 zone, in which land may be
used for "the raising of poultry, rabbits, and chincillas and the
keeping of domestic animals in conjunction with the residential
use of a lot." 0 desires to keep bees on his lot. He requests your
advice as to whether such action on his part is permitted under
the zoning law. What advice would you give him? See People
v. Kasold, 153 Cal. App.2d 891, 314 P.2d 241 (1957).15
As the first assignment in Property I, the first unlucky student
called upon will usually respond to this question by asserting that
one must define what "domestic animals" are, as opposed to "wild
animals." (In Chicago, the more "street-wise" student will occa-
sionally answer that the first thing to do is to seek a zoning variance.
While of course being a sensible suggestion, the teacher need merely
suggest that this might be too "costly.") Where does one obtain a
definition of domestic animals? Why from prior case law-or from
Blackstone. Suppose no prior authorities deal with the question of
whether bees are domestic or wild, or the authorities are in conflict.
Then what? Now some bright student will, suggest that this being a
matter of statutory construction, one must look at the legislative
history. But assume there is no legislative history (a reasonable
assumption for a municipal ordinance). If our client is planning a
63. See Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV.
L. REV. 721 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 LoNDON
Q. REV. 35 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV. L. Rav.
1349 (1954); Leach, Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Courts and Practitioners Can Do A bout
the Follies of the Rule, 13 KAN. L. REv. 351 (1965).
64. Note, The Law Teacher as Legal Reformer: 1900-1945, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508 (1977).
65. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 60, at 23.
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heavy investment in bees, the only way to get a definitive answer
to his question is through litigation of some sort. The question of
whether bees are domestic or wild must then be decided by a judge.
Usually another bright student will comment that one must ascer-
tain the purpose behind the statute; and will conclude that the
purpose of the statute was to protect passers-by from physical injury
or attack. Fine. What will our client, 0, attempt to argue? Why,
that his bees are (or will be) harmless, not given to wanderlust, and
hopefully, that the bees will be housed at a great distance from
public thoroughfares. Who will win the case? Most students will rule
against 0 on the grounds that the bees probably will be dangerous
to neighbors and to the public (Although one year, there was a
beekeeper in the class who strenuously maintained that most spec-
ies of bees were perfectly harmless). In any event, the students are
led to the conclusion that the judge ought to decide whether the bees
are domestic or wild (and therefore covered or not covered by the
statute) on the basis of whether the decision would result in any
danger to the public. Setting aside the more difficult question of
whether the distance of the hives from the public roadway or the lot
line should influence the decision, one can see that students are led
away from their initial inclination to assume that to apply a rule,
one need merely speculate about and define the terms of the rule.
They are led toward the conclusion that choice of a specific result
governs how we define and apply rules, which is usually contrary to
all their prior training in interpreting the rules they have come in
contact with, including ethical and moral rules. In other words,
what the law is, is "ruled" by legislative purpose, and by the choice
of result. The result is not logically preordained and fixed deduc-
tively by the language of the statute or rule. This is, I believe, the
most difficult principle to grasp for most students.
2. The Case of the Boot-legged Whiskey.
In their section on unconscious possession, Casner and Leach in-
clude the case of State v. Cox" wherein a hotel porter was convicted
under an Oregon criminal statute prohibiting the possession of in-
toxicating liquor. It seems that the porter was "caught" transport-
ing guest baggage from a railroad depot to the hotel. In one of the
suitcases he was transporting were 12 bottles of whiskey. The lower
66. 91 Oregon 518, 179 P. 575 (1919) (CASNER & LEACH, supra note 60, at 43.).
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court ignored the porter's contention that he did not know he was
carrying whiskey, considering knowledge irrelevant under the stat-
ute. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. They decided that
absent an express statutory declaration to the contrary, such a crim-
inal statute must be presumed to include the requirement of knowl-
edge of wrongdoing. The case is, of course, an excellent introduction
to the problem of liability without fault and to common law statu-
tory interpretation, but it also can be made to illustrate an addi-
tional critical point. One must ask the students what would happen
if a similar porter were "held up"while transporting concealed whis-
key back to the hotel. Suppose that a highwayman carried off the
whiskey and was later apprehended and charged with highway rob-
bery. Also suppose that the highway robbery statute established as
one of its crucial elements the taking of property from the possession
of another. If State v. Cox were binding precedent in the jurisdic-
tion, would the highwayman have a defense based on the contention
that since the porter did not know about the whiskey, he was not in
"possession" of it and that therefore the highwayman did not take
property from the "possession" of another under the highway rob-
bery statute? It seems like a preposterous suggestion, but if the
question is put artfully, students will often have difficulty answer-
ing it. The point is that the word "possession," like other legal terms
cannot be defined in any one fixed way. Legal terms and concepts
take their meaning and function from the context in which they are
found and may vary depending upon the legal or factual context.
This contention would seem to be remarkably similar to the view
taken in Wittgenstein's later writings. It is directly contrary to the
layman's assumption that to apply a rule, all one must do is read
the rule and define its terms. Notice how far removed it is from
Kohlberg's fourth state of moral development as well.
3. Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex.
Justice Cardozo in Doctor v. Hughes7 not only resurrected the
feudal doctrine of Worthier Title (which doctrine turned a remain-
der in the grantor's heirs into a reversion in the grantor-essentially
for purposes of preventing avoidance of feudal taxes); he expanded
it, by construing it to be a "rule of construction," an odd result since
there were no feudal taxes to avoid in New York in 1919. Among
67. 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
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Leach's criticisms of this landmark case, he argues, "The feudal
reason for the rule does not exist in the United States, so the rule
should not exist. Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex. '" Leach ex-
panded on the maxim thus:
There is a danger in our Anglo-American practice of deciding
a particular case before the court and then putting into a
judicially-announced verbal capsule a generalized principle
upon which the case is decided-for example, 'No interest is
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest.' The danger
is that the verbal formulation, properly adaptable to the case
at bar, will then be given quasi-legislative force and woodenly
applied to other cases where the same policy issues are not
involved. Too often neglected is a wise precept: 'Every opinion
must be read in the light of the facts then presented.' State-
ments of rules as applicable to that case cannot be taken out
of their context and stretched to different circumstances not
before the mind of the court. (Swan v. Justices of the Superior
Court, 222 Mass. 542, 545 111 N.E. 386 (1916), per Rugg, C.J.).
The key to the Doctrine of Precedents is the old maxim:
Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex. To this maxim we should like
to add the correlative of our own concoction: Durante ratione,
durat ipsa lex.1'
And commenting on the abandonment by the House of Lords of
rigid stare decisis, Leach remarks:
Stare decisis is a habit of mind in all walks of life-the profes-
sions, business, family life. One does what one has done before
in similar circumstances. It gives stability and continuity in all
human activity. But when it is obvious that one's previous
actions turned out badly, or that circumstances are essentially
different, the intelligent human being reviews the problem
anew; if, with due consideration to desiderata of stability and
continuity, he concludes that something different should be
done in the future, a different course is generally charted.
For a prodigiously thorough survey of the current willingness
of American courts to overrule in one branch of the law, torts,
68. LEACH & J. LoGAN, TEACHERS' MANUAL to accompany FUTr INrua RE AND ESTATz
PLANNING, supra note 61, [hereinafter cited as TEACHERS' MANUAL].
69. LEACH & LOGAN, supra note 61, at 884.
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see Keeton, "Judicial Law Reform-A Perspective on the Per-
formance of Appellate Courts," 44 Texas L. Rev. 1254 (1966).
This article is a veritable textbook for the judicial reformer,
even rivaling the great dissent of Vanderbilt, C.J., in Fox v.
Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 14, 76 A.2d 877, 878 (1950). 0
It has been pointed out that a student is left at a serious disadvan-
tage with respect to mastering the dynamics of this maxim if he only
seeks to state the rule in a case (the black letter law) without at-
tempting to apply the principles of an earlier case to new factual
situations.
Difficult as is the judge's task in discharge of these obligations
with respect to rule definition, the student's task in study brief
statement of rules is harder. Thus, in prospective view, the
judge's aim is clarity-but here he has his own intended mean-
ing to guide him. In retrospective view, the judge is guided by
a specific set of facts, in terms of which to frame his inquiry
into the rule of a prior decision. The student has neither aid.71
Yet how many students understand why exclusive reliance on
outlines and definitions not only retards their growth in understand-
ing of the law, but also affects what values they themselves incorpo-
rate into the law as professionals? 2
4. Magic Words.
In law, a layman's use of an apparently innocent word (or failure
to use an apparently innocent word) in a will, trust, or contract may
have dire consequences.
The fatal words once used, the law fastens upon them, and
attaches to them its own meaning and effect as to the estate
70. Leach, supra note 56, at 803 and 803 n.19.
71. Gross, supra note 8, at 282.
72. Leach presents numerous examples where the maxim, in his judgment, should have
been applied. He ridicules the Illinois Supreme Court's unknowing extension of the Rule in
Shelley's Case in People v. Emery, 314 Ill. 220, 145 N.E. 349 (1924) (cited in LEACH & LOGAN,
supra note 61, at 118). Leach excoriates the court in Re Gaite's Will Trusts, Chancery Division
(1949), 1 All. E.R. 459, the famous precocious toddler's case:
In my view the court should have said that, although they are bound by Jee v. Audley
to hold that women of advanced age can have children, there is nothing that binds
them to an additional absurdity by saying that a child under the age of 5 can have a
child.
TEACHERS' MANUAL, supra note 68, at 21-85.
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created by them, and rejects, as inconsistent with the main
purpose which it inexorably and despotically fixes on the
donor, all the provisions of the will which would be incompati-
ble with an estate of inheritance and which tend to show that
no such estate was intended to be created; although, all the
while, it may be as clear as the sun at noonday that by such a
construction the intention of the testator is violated in every
particular. . . . 3
While the above was written about the word "heirs" in connection
with the late lamented Rule in Shelley's Case, the question of
whether the attitude expressed above is generally just or fair is
another matter. In Whitby v. Von Luedecke,74 a special power cre-
ated in a marriage settlement was exercised by appointing that the
income be divided between Ann and Lucy (children of the wife who
exercised the power) during their respective lives and, at the death
of any, the "survivor" to receive the whole of said income. The Court
held that Lucy, who survived Ann, was not entitled to all the income
because the interest in the "survivor" was "contingent" and there-
fore a violation of the Rule against Perpetuities. Leach points out
that the same gifts could have been made incontestably valid by a
mere change in the language to read, "The income one-half to Ann
for life, remainder to Lucy for life; the other half to Lucy for life,
remainder to Ann for life." Then all gifts would be vested and not
run afoul of the Rule. This was, of course, substantially what was
intended. Leach argues that the fact that a word of contingency
such as "survivor" was used should not alter the result. Examples
of this sort of thing fill the reporters. 5 How unreasonable, argues
Leach, that words (especially when written by laymen) can be given
uncertain and technical interpretations in lawsuits which thwart
73. Jordan v. Adams, 9 C.B.N.S. 483 (1861), (reprinted in LEACH & LOGAN, supra note
61, at 132-33).
74. Whitby v. Von Luedecke, Court of Chancery [1906] 1 Ch. 783 (reprinted in LEACH &
LOGAN, supra note 61, at 263).
75. In Ice v. Andley, Court of Chancery (1787), 1 Cox 324 (reprinted in LEACH & LOGAN,
supra note 61, at 685), the famous "Fertile Octogenarian" case, the interest was struck down
because the bequest referred to four "daughters," rather than naming them individually. In
Walker v. Marcellus, 226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736, N. Ct. App. 1919) (reprinted in LEACH &
LOGAN, supra note 61, at 48), Leach points out (TEACHERS' MANUAL, supra note 68, at 2-5)
that two pieces of paper would have done the trick where one failed. And in Tygard v.
McComb, 54 Mo. App. 85 (Ct. App. 1893) (reprinted in CASNER & LEACH, supra note 60, at
132) the failure to use the one word "trust" proved to be fatal to an attempt to set up a Totten
trust.
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the legitimate intentions of the grantors. Certainly no layman and
few attorneys would understand, when drafting dispositive instru-
ments, the implications of using such alternative forms of language
in order to accomplish substantially the identical result. Leach
cinches the argument thus:
It is suggested that the quotations from the Court of Appeal
indicate a basic misconception of the nature and function of
the Rule against Perpetuities. If it is unsound policy to permit
the surviving daughter to take the whole income during the
balance of her life (a matter that is arguable either way as an
original proposition), then this estate to the surviving daughter
ties up the trust too long and should be invalidated, no matter
how the direction to the trustee is expressed by T. But it is no
part of the policy of the Rule against Perpetuities to require
that the giving of a remainder interest be expressed in certain
words and not in others. When the judicial members of our
profession have stricken down the intended dispositions of a
testator on the basis of an alleged supervening public policy
and when we are asked to explain the iniquity of the testator,
it is not impressive to reply, "Well, he used the wrong
words-or rather his lawyer did.""
The lessons to be garnered from the problem of the magic words
are at least three-fold. Draftsmen must learn what terms to avoid
(or use carefully)," advocates must be aware that they may be
called upon to argue either that a term must be given a technical
meaning, or (if on the other side) that the court must look beyond
the terms to find what was substantially intended. Decision-makers
must look more to substance than technicality. The process of look-
ing to the consequences of a decision rather than taking the auspices
through technical word analysis is a difficult position to maintain
and there is much in legal history that mitigates against it. It is
often identified with the technique in advocacy of reaching a conclu-
sion and then offering a rationalization as an after thought. The
approach, however, deserves more serious consideration if justice is
to be accomplished."
76. TEACHERS' MANUAL, supra note 68, at 8.
77. See LEACH & LOGAN, supra note 61, at 330 and TEACHERS' MANUAL, supra note 68, at
8-20 for Leach's candid discussion of the Divide and Pay Over Rule on this point.
78. It is particularly appropriate where looking for the intention of the donor. See, Llewel-
lyn, Book Review, 51 HARV. L. REv. 757 (1937). See also Estate of Balke, 157 Cal. 448 (1910),
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5. "A" Does Not Necessarily Imply "B," or the Problem of
Indicators.
Because a document contains words or terms necessitating a re-
sult with respect to one rule or set of doctrines (result A), that need
not also necessitate a result with respect to a second set of doctrines
(result B), with respect to which the document is otherwise silent.
Why should words requiring result A, also require result B which the
draftsman probably never thought about or foresaw? For example,
suppose a devise to "William for life, remainder to William's chil-
dren if any, but if William has no children, to Coots and Oldfield."
Coots died during William's lifetime. In In Re Coots' Estate" the
court held that Coots' estate took nothing. Reasoning that since the
interest was "contingent," Coots must survive William in order to
take. The case was severely criticized at the time it came down, and
was corrected by legislation. As Leach points out,"0 the fact that the
interest is "contingent" in a quasi-feudal sense should have no bear-
ing on the separate and distinct question of survivorship. Criticism
can be also leveled at cases where the fact that a testamentary gift
is in the traditional form of a class gift has been held to imply a
requirement of survivorship as well. The majority of courts have
established such a "rule of construction" but it is hard to justify,
argue Leach and Logan, on the basis of strict logic or in a number
of instances from an examination of the resulting distribution.,"
Similarly, the so-called double distribution rule runs afoul of the
same logic. In Baylies v. Hamilton,s2 a residuary gift to "the children
of Schuyler" was held to exclude one child born after the testator's
death. This was at least arguable under the "Rule of Convenience"
(which closes a class at the point of first distribution). But the court
went on and excluded the afterborn child from a devise of a
remainder in realty which was to "go with my residuary estate."
"Inexcusable," protest Leach and Logan. It may be reassuring that
unfair results might sometimes be prevented with logic yet to leave
a future interest case where it is evident that the court reached a conclusion and then wrote
an opinion about it. Leach discussed this case in TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 68, at 8-16.
79. In Re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich. 208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931) (reprinted in LEACH & LOGAN,
supra note 61, at 319).
80. TEACHERS' MANUAL, supra note 68, at 8-18.
81. See, e.g., Blackstone v. Althouse, 278 Ill. 481, 116 N.E. 154 (1917); In Re Moss, [18991
2 Ch. 314 (Ch. App.); Roberts v. Trustees of Trust Fund, 96 N.H. 223, 73 A.2d 119 (1950).
82. Baylies v. Hamilton, 36 App. Div. 133, 55 N.Y.S. 390 (1899) (reprinted in LEACH &
LOGAN, supra note 61, at 376).
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it at that sidesteps the value problem. While these sorts of criticisms
admittedly involve but one small comer of the law, where we are
interpreting the will or trust, and therefore the intentions of but one
person, the ramifications are more widespread. Leach and Logan
force us to examine our logic in terms of just or sensible results-one
the grantor would have wanted if he had thought about the problem.
6. Planning at Common Law.
The technicality ridden Rule against Perpetuities was originally
developed from case law, and only the broad parameters of the Rule
were set in the Duke of Norfolk's case.Y Lord Nottingham holds that
an interest which must vest within a life in being is clearly not a
perpetuity. On the other hand, the settlement of an interest or an
estate in tail, with remainders expectant upon it such that the ten-
ant in tail in possession cannot dock or remove them, makes such
remainders perpetuities or "perpetual clogs on the title." What of
interests that might vest later than a life in being, but certainly
sooner than the natural termination of a fee tail? Lord Nottingham
has left such questions as this for later courts to handle. Leach was
fond of Lord Nottingham's famous dictum in this case, "Where will
you stop if you do not stop here? I will tell you where I will stop: I
will stop wherever any visible inconvenience doth appear; for the
just bounds of. . .[a perpetuity] ... . are not yet determined, but
the first inconvenience that ariseth upon it will regulate it." 81 This,
then, is the classic statement of the flexible case by case approach.
Says Leach:
The Rule against Perpetuities grew up in the finest tradition
of the English common law. On several counts the Duke of
Norfolk's Case could be recommended to a Civilian as typical
of the best in law development by adjudication: (1) Lord Not-
tingham, weighing considerations of policy and logic, enunci-
ated a principle for testing the validity of future interests under
the new conditions created by the rise of indestructible execu-
tory interests; (2) he at the same time resisted the temptation
to crystallize the principle into a rule before experience and
cumulative wisdom should indicate exact limits . ..8
83. Charles Howard v. Duke of Norfolk, [1682] 3 Ch. 1, 26 (reprinted in LEACH & LOGAN,
supra note 61, at 672).
84. LEACH AND LOGAN, supra note 61, at 678.
85. Id. at 670.
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Leach also publishes a dissent from this view:
A dissent to this eulogy of the Duke of Norfolk's Case, it seems
to me, illustrates the great inherent vice of the common law
system, namely: the creation of principles without indication
of the extent of application.
'This vice makes it impossible for the best lawyer to know
what can or cannot be done. You point with pride at the cen-
tury and a half of fumbling with the rule until it was finally
fixed; but every step was at the expense of costly litigation, and
probably many a testotor's dispositions were wrecked-and yet
at almost every lecture this year you have stressed, and rightly,
the importance of intelligent drafting and avoidance of litiga-
tion . . . let us place ourselves in the office of an English solici-
tor in 1700. Testator wants to know for how long he can tie up
the estate. The solicitor explains the limitation in the Duke of
Norfolk's Case. "Yes," says the testator, "but what is the
limit?" "Well," answers the solicitor, "Lord Nottingham says
he will stop wherever any 'visible inconvenience' doth appear."
"But what is this 'visible inconvenience'?" asks the testator.
"How should I know?" responds the solicitor, "I'm not the
chancellor's conscience." "What do you mean by that
remark?" asks the testator. "I mean," replies the solicitor,
"that the scope of 'visible inconvenience' will depend on who
is the judge at the particular time the question comes up, who
is the counsel, who are the parties, whether the sum involved
in large enough to attract serious attention, or so small that
indifferent lawyers argue the case and the judge is indifferent
to the result, whether there happens at the time to be a reform
wave stirring so that the judges are swayed by popular ideas of
justice . . . in short, the solution depends on a multitude of
unforeseeable things, and thus if you go beyond Norfolk's Case
I cannot certainly advise you whether it will be good or bad."
"This is passing strange," laments the testator, "the Statute
of Wills tells me precisely what I may or may not do in the form
or method of devising, why cannot there be a statute which
tells me what I may or may not do in the creation of future
estates?" "Oh," says the solicitor airily, "that is not the genius
of the common law."
This has always seemed wrong to me. Whether a rule against
perpetuities is desirable or not, should be, in my mind,
threshed out in Parliament or a state legislature. People might
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well say, with reason, that families should be allowed to create
perpetuities of land in certain amounts, that such an institu-
tion would make for stability of a nation. Whether this is true
should be discovered by rational discussion and investigation,
and statutory trial and error, rather than the extremely acci-
dental, hit or miss, process of costly litigation, which puts the
expense of working out social rules on a few unlucky individu-
als.86
We fool ourselves by thinking that this dilemma is not still with
us. With the enormous growth of administrative law in recent years,
it may be a more critical problem than ever. 7 Surely we ought to
give more attention to the question of where to strike the proper
balance such that fair results in individual cases will ensue. And if,
as Leach apparently believed, the hardship of uncertainty ought to
be placed on the planner in order to insure needed flexibility in the
law, should we not devote more attention to the importance of solid
preventative thinking rather than taking refuge behind easy but
rigid dogmas?
CONCLUSION
Where law is rigid, fixed and certain, there is little room for reflec-
tion about conflicting values. One must essentially stand outside
such a system to question it. The genius of the common law is its
flexibility, its openness to change, and its ability to continually
renew itself. When administrered according to its own terms, it is a
self-regulating system capable of generating and acting upon feed-
back. 8 To be certain that the concern for doing justice in the indi-
vidual case is maintained and strengthened, we as teachers must be
concerned with this, our singular approach to making value judg-
ments. It is our job to disabuse students of the possibility of achiev-
ing absolute certainty. I think this reality sooner or later dawns on
most students. As Turow relates about one of his professors:
I wondered when he would cut it out. There was no answer to
these questions. There never would be.
86. Id. at 670-71.
87. See Gray, Administrative Law in Illinois: Recent Trends and Developments, 8 Loy.
U.L.J. 511 (1977).
88. See K. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES OF GOVERNMENT (rev. ed. 1966).
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I sat still for a second. Then I repeated what I'd just thought
to myself: There were no answers. That was the point, the one
Zechman-and some of the other professors less tirelessly-had
been trying to make for weeks. Rules are declared. But the
theoretical dispute is never settled.89
But the probability that there are no answers, does not mean that
there are no values or that we are not constantly choosing among
relative competing value concerns. We are, tentatively. The com-
mon law as taught in American law schools is laced with evaluation
every time a case is decided in court and every time a hypothetical
is discussed in class. But we tend to avoid the careful labeling or
dissecting of values. This avoidance is a mistake because by doing
so, we cloud both for ourselves and our students the methodology
of the law which the professional lawyer and the student must grasp
even if methodology itself is not capable of being cited in court.
There has been a dearth of concern for methods as such. 0 It has
been said:
The entering student stands at the threshold of a three-year
enterprise, in one sense, but of a lifelong enterprise in another
sense. The student's task is to begin to become a lawyer. The
task of becoming a lawyer can be meaningful to the student
only to the extent he concretely understands: (a) his goals-
what he personally is working toward; and (b) his methods-
how the things he does in law school will carry him toward
those goals. The first is a function of professional self-
definition; the second is a function of professional self-
development."
"Thinking like a lawyer" includes knowing where the value com-
ponent fits in and being able to identify it, at least intuitively. It is
hoped that the examples from Property and Future Interests dis-
cussed above illustrates how values creep into our teaching through
concern for individual results which serve as correctives to more
general principles. But the method itself represents a certain over-
riding value, namely, the concern for the just result itself and how
results count in a system of rules.
89. TUROW, supra note 1, at 112.
90. Costello, supra note 41.
91. Gross, supra note 8, at 309.
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This concern for values is not necessarily a call for a return to
natural law theories. Such a concern has frequently been the hall-
mark of the natural law school, whose opinions have sometimes
been expressed quite dogmatically." Concern for values must not be
allowed to be the sole property of the various natural law advo-
cates," nor a pawn in the dispute between positivists and those who
take the natural law position. Our seldom admitted inculcation of
values is an integral part of the case method (from Langdell's time)
and its scientific spirit of free inquiry.'
In this respect the values inherent in the case-method and the
evaluative aspects of the case method are quietly revolutionary. It
was said of Langdell that, "one of the most striking facts in [his]
life . . .is the deep silence which surrounds his work. He accom-
plished a revolution without getting into a controversy."15
We sometimes in our haste think that minds that act with
deliberation are apt to be too cautious to accomplish great
things. Mr. Langdell acted deliberately, and his nature was
thoroughly conservative; yet few men, however radical, have
effected greater changes than he."
We have already noted Professor Leach's vast reformation efforts
in his chosen area.
John Rawls (the neo-Kantian philosopher) in his monumental A
Theory of Justice sets up his arguiment for principles of justice to
be agreed upon in his quasi-Lockian "original position" (a hypothet-
ical "state of nature") with this comment: "[T]o understand these
principles should not require a knowledge of contingent particulars,
and surely not a reference to individuals or associations."' 7 While
qualified in other places (and taking into consideration the special
conditions pertaining to the "original position"), Rawls elsewhere
concedes the deontological nature of his theory. The quoted state-
ment, I think, would not be readily agreed to by a common law
92. This is where I would find fault with Glasser's similar expression of concern. Glasser,
Philosophical Values and Legal Education, 3 J. LEGAL EtUc. 60 (1950).
93. See Pound, On Law Teacher and Law Teaching, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 519 (1951). "Today
new fashions are beginning to be set by new types of logical approach; by neo-Kantian
methodology or more attractively by a rising cult of natural law and call for a trek back to
Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle." Id. at 521.
94. See Schofield, supra note 4, at 291.
95. Id. at 286.
96. Beal, Professor Langdell-Later Teaching Days, 20 HARV. L. REv. 11 (1906).
97. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 132 (1971).
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attorney, and would in fact be objected to strenuously. Our actions
should not be governed solely by blind adherence to a universal rule
(or rules) that has been formed in ignorance or disregard of unique
events. If this would be the automatic reaction, then such a common
law attorney is in that sense taking a relatively revolutionary stand,
for he would be reacting at the level of Kohlberg's fifth stage and
expressing an opinion contrary to that of the vast majority of man-
kind. 8 Perhaps this is part of what is meant by critics when they
charge that law school instruction today is geared toward an elite
group." It may also explain why we have so much difficulty with
frustration and alienation among law students.
We have neglected to explore the relationship between our way
of making value judgments in the legal field and situation ethics.
The similarity is more striking, I believe, than we care to admit. It
has been said:
I do not, therefore, regard 'ethics' as theory in a way that
would, at least implicitly, suppose it to be the origin of morality
and of moral codes. 'Experience' is the source in human living
for morality and the summaries of lived efforts to be moral.
Thus, 'experience,' has to be the subject matter of analysis by
the discipline of 'ethics' insofar as that discipline is prepared
to search out the human basis for morality and for the expres-
sion of morality in codes of conduct of one or another kind.I
It might be of some benefit to our institutions if moralists, ethni-
cians and educational philosophers devoted more attention to the
law school case-method and common law system. By the same
token, law students and lawyers might benefit from a more explicit
treatment of ethics in the broad sense, that is, value judgments.
Professor Harold J. Berman has written:
You probably know the famous story, from the late 19th or
early 20th century, about the student at Harvard Law School
who said in class discussion, 'But Sir, is that just?' And the
professor replied, 'If it's justice you're interested in, you should
have gone to the divinity school!' That was, perhaps, the high-
water mark of the effort to view law as a self-contained isolated
98. Noonan, supra note 25, at 386.
99. Gross, supra note 8.
100. Bresnahan, supra note 44, at 202.
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system, which is, I think, a kind of idolatry. And we are not so
far from it in our courses today.''
The highest compliment the author ever received as a teacher
occurred a few years ago when a student in Property came into the
faculty offices for a chat. This particular student had been a philos-
ophy professor at a local college. He asserted that in all his studies
he had always heard or read about the "Socratic method," but this
was the first time he had ever seen it practiced! Once he caught on
to what was happening in class, his grades were excellent. Why is
it that the pursuit of justice is often so painful? Shouldn't we strive
to make it just a little easier for our students?
101. Berman, The Secularization of American Legal Education in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries, 27 J. LEGAL Enuc. 385 (1975).
